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Abstract: We investigate the consequences of assuming private communica-
tion between the principal and each of his agents in an otherwise standard
mechanism design setting. Doing so simpliﬁes optimal mechanisms and in-
stitutions. It restores both the continuity of the principal’s and the agents’
payoﬀs and that of the optimal mechanism with respect to the information
structure. Nevertheless, it still maintains the useful role of correlation to better
extract the agents’ information rent. We ﬁrst prove a Revelation Principle with
private communication that characterizes the set of allocations implementable
under private communication by means of simple non-manipulability con-
straints. We also demonstrate a Taxation Principle which helps drawing some
links between private communication and limited commitment on the prin-
cipal’s side. Equipped with those tools, we derive optimal non-manipulable
mechanisms in various environments (separable projects, multi-unit auctions,
team productions).
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11 Introduction
Over the last thirty years, mechanism design has been viewed as the most powerful tool
to understand how complex organizations and institutions are shaped. By means of the
Revelation Principle,1 this theory characterizes the set of implementable allocations in
contexts where information is decentralized and privately known by agents at the periph-
ery of the organization. Once this ﬁrst step of the analysis is performed and a particular
optimization criterion is speciﬁed at the outset, one can ﬁnd an optimal incentive feasible
allocation and look for particular institutions that could implement this outcome.
Although this methodology has been successful to understand auction design, regu-
lation theory, optimal organizations of the ﬁrm, etc... it has also faced severe critiques
coming from various fronts. The ﬁrst line of critiques followed the works of Riordan
and Sappington (1988), Cr´ emer and McLean (1985, 1988), Johnson, Pratt and Zeck-
hauser (1990), d’Aspremont, Cr´ emer and Gerard-Varet (1990), Matsushima (1991) and
McAfee and Reny (1992). In various contexts, those authors have all argued that private
information is costless for an organization. When agents have correlated types, a clever
mechanism designer can design complex lotteries to induce costless information revelation
and fully extract the agents’ surplus if needed. Without correlation, privately informed
agents earn instead information rents and optimal mechanisms must generally reach a
genuine trade-oﬀ between rent extraction and allocative eﬃciency which disappears when
types are (even slightly) correlated. This lack of continuity of the optimal mechanism
with respect to the information structure is clearly troublesome and a signiﬁcant impedi-
ment to the “Wilson Doctrine” which argues that mechanisms should be robust to small
perturbations of the game modelling. Clearly, the received theory of mechanism design
fails to pass this test.
Although related to the ﬁrst critique above, the second source of scepticism points
out that mechanisms are in practice much simpler than predicted by the received theory.
In real-world organizations, the scope for yardstick competition and relative performance
evaluations seems quite limited. Agents hardly receive contracts which are so dependent
on what their peers might claim. Multilateral contracting in complex organizations seems
closer to a superposition of simple bilateral contracts between the principal and each of his
agents, although how it diﬀers has to a large extent not yet been explored theoretically.2
Finally, an often heard criticism of the mechanism design literature points out that
communication between the principal and his agents may not be as transparent as as-
1Gibbard (1973) and Green and Laﬀont (1977) among others.
2Payments on ﬁnancial markets depend on how much an agent wants to buy from an asset and, of
course, of the equilibrium price but rarely on the whole vector of quantities requested by other traders as
the theory would predict. Similarly, incentive payments within ﬁrms do not look like complex lotteries.
1sumed. In the canonical framework for Bayesian collective choices3 communication be-
tween the principal and his agents is public.4 This facilitates the implementation of the
allocation recommended by the mechanism by making credible that the principal sticks
to the complex rewards and punishments needed to obtain truthful revelation at minimal
cost. The ﬂip-side of more opaque institutions is that the principal may act oppor-
tunistically and manipulate himself the agents’ messages if he ﬁnds it worth. Lack of
transparency and opportunistic behavior on the principal’s side go hands in hands.
Our model responds to all those criticisms and goes towards describing weaker insti-
tutions than currently assumed in standard mechanism design. To do so, we relax the
assumption that communication between the principal and each of his agents is public.
Considering private communication ﬁrst simpliﬁes signiﬁcantly mechanisms and stresses
the major role played by nonlinear prices in such environments. Second, it restores con-
tinuity with respect to the information structure for both the players’ payoﬀs and the
optimal mechanism. Still, this assumption maintains correlation as a means to better
(but not fully) extract the agents’ information rent. Third, introducing private commu-
nication in correlated information environments restores and generalizes the well-known
techniques for deriving optimal mechanisms in settings with independent types.
Let us describe in more details these diﬀerent ﬁndings:
• Simplicity of mechanisms and institutions: When communication between the
principal and his agents is private, the former might have strong incentives to manipulate
what he has learned from one agent to punish arbitrarily others and reap the corresponding
punishments. With private communication, the set of incentive feasible mechanisms is
severely restricted to avoid such manipulations. We ﬁrst prove a Revelation Principle with
private communication which characterizes this set. For a given implementation concept
(Bayesian-Nash or dominant strategy) characterizing the agents’ behavior there is no loss
of generality in restricting the analysis to non-manipulable mechanisms characterized by
means of simple non-manipulability constraints.
Equipped with this tool, we investigate the form of optimal non-manipulable mecha-
nisms in various environments of increasing complexity.
In the simple case where agents run independent projects on behalf of the principal, the
only interaction between them is an informational one: Their costs are correlated. Non-
manipulability constraints have then strong implications on the form of feasible contracts.
To avoid manipulations, the principal makes the agent’s residual claimant for the return of
his own project through a sell-out contract whose entry fee depends on the agent’s report
3Myerson (1991, Chapter 6.4) for instance.
4This should be contrasted with the case of moral hazard where agents are ﬁrst asked to report
conﬁdentially their types to the principal who then recommends some actions which depend only on their
own announced types. Myerson (1982).
2on his type only. With such contract, the principal commits himself to be indiﬀerent
between all possible outputs that a given agent may produce.
To avoid manipulations by the principal, mechanisms must limit the informational role
of what has been learned from others in determining the compensation and output of each
agent. In that context, nonlinear prices play a signiﬁcant role and a Taxation Principle
holds. Taking into account the non-manipulability constraints is actually equivalent to
imposing that the principal proposes menus of nonlinear prices to the agents and then
picks his most preferred quantities ex post, once the agents have revealed their types
by choosing within those menus. In other words, the non-manipulability constraints
describe an environment where the principal cannot commit to a rule stipulating the
agents’ outputs as a function of their reports. Complex organizations are then run by
contracts which look like bilateral ones. Nevertheless, in Bayesian environments, the
optimal mechanism still strictly dominates the simple superposition of bilateral contracts.
Equipped with this Taxation Principle, we develop techniques to characterize non-
manipulable mechanisms. The key observation is that, under private communication, the
variables available for contracting between the principal and each agent are not observable
by others. In other words, non-manipulability constraints can also be understood as
incentive constraints on the principal’s side preventing him from lying on what he has
learned from contracting with others. We can then use standard techniques from the
screening literature to derive optimal non-manipulable mechanisms in various contexts.
In the case of multi-unit auctions, a resource allocation problem between competing
bidders is added on top of the informational externality. The optimal mechanism turns
out be an all-pay auction both when types are correlated and when they are not. In a
symmetric environment, the buyer (principal) selects the most eﬃcient seller who pays
the highest entry fee and produces all output for the principal. Again, the principal is
indiﬀerent between all possible outputs that this winning agent could produce but now,
on top of that, the principal does not want to manipulate the identity of who produces.
Finally, we consider a team production context where two agents exert eﬀorts which
are perfect complements. Nonlinear contracts are now more complex: Each agent only
gets a fraction of the overall return of the team activity. This fraction of the overall return
of the activity depends on both agents’ eﬃciency parameters.
• Continuity of mechanisms and payoﬀs: Even when the agents’ types are correlated,
insisting on the non-manipulability of the mechanism restores a genuine trade-oﬀ between
rent extraction and eﬃciency. Of course, how this trade-oﬀ aﬀects contract design depends
on the level of correlation but it does so in an intuitive way. Correlation makes it easier to
extract the agents’ information rent. When correlation diminishes, the optimal mechanism
implements an allocation that comes close to that obtained for independent types but
3without the non-manipulability constraint. Non-manipulability constraints do not bind in
the limit of no correlation. With independent types, there always exists an implementation
of the second-best which is non-manipulable by the principal. Not only the continuity of
the principal’s and the agents’ payoﬀs is restored but also that of the optimal mechanism
which keeps the same structure whatever the degree of correlation. As an example, the
all-pay auction remains optimal whatever the level of correlation in the agents’ types (as
long as it is small enough).
• Solution techniques: Finally, standard techniques used to perform second-best anal-
ysis in settings with independent types can be rather straightforwardly adapted to the
case of correlation. In particular, a generalized virtual cost taking into account the corre-
lation of types can be deﬁned and plays the same role as in the independent type case in
evaluating the trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and rent extraction.
Section 2 discusses the relevant literature. Section 3 presents our general model and
exposes a few polar cases of interest for the rest of the analysis. In Section 4, we develop
a very simple example highlighting the role of private communication in constraining
mechanisms. Section 5 proves the Revelation and Taxation Principles with private com-
munication. Equipped with these tools, we characterize optimal mechanisms in the case
of separable projects (Section 6), with general production externalities (Section 7), multi-
unit auctions (Section 8), and teams (Section 9). Section 10 concludes and proposes alleys
for further research. All proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
2 Literature Review
The strong results on the beneﬁts of correlated information pushed forward by Cr´ emer and
McLean (1985, 1988), Riordan and Sappington (1988), Johnson, Pratt and Zeckhauser
(1990), d’Aspremont, Cr´ emer and Gerard-Varet (1990), Matsushima (1991) and McAfee
and Reny (1992) have already been attacked on various fronts. A ﬁrst approach is to
introduce exogenous limits or costs on feasible punishments by means of risk-aversion and
wealth eﬀects (Robert 1991, Eso 2004), limited liability (Demougin and Garvie 1991),
ex post participation constraints ( Demski and Sappington 1988, Dana 1993), or limited
enforceability (Compte and Jehiel 2006). Here instead, the beneﬁts of using correlated
information is undermined by incentive constraints on the principal’s side.
A second approach points out that correlated information may not be as generic as
suggested by the earlier literature. Enriching the information structure may actually lead
to a signiﬁcant simpliﬁcation of mechanisms. Neeman (2004) points out that the type of
an agent should not simultaneously determine his beliefs on others and be payoﬀ-relevant.
Such extension of the type space might reinstall some sort of conditional independence
4and avoid full extraction.5 Bergemann and Morris (2005) argue that modelling higher
order beliefs leads to ex post implementation whereas Chung and Ely (2005) show that
a maxmin principal may want to rely on dominant strategy implementation. Although
important, these approaches lead also to extreme results since Bayesian mechanisms end
up being given up.6,7 Our approach still relaxes the common knowledge requirements
assumed in standard mechanism design but private communication does so in a simple
and tractable way.8 As a result, optimal mechanisms keep much of the features found
in the case of independent types and Bayesian implementation keeps some of its force.
Resolution techniques to derive optimal mechanisms are also quite similar.
A last approach to avoid the full surplus extraction in correlated environments consists
in considering collusive behavior. Laﬀont and Martimort (2000) show that mechanisms
extracting entirely all the agents’ surplus are not robust to horizontal collusion between
the agents.9 Key to this horizontal collusion possibility is the fact that the agents can coor-
dinate their strategies in any grand-mechanism oﬀered by the designer. This coordination
is facilitated when communication is public. Hence, our focus on private communication
points at another polar case which leaves less scope for such horizontal collusion. Gromb
and Martimort (2006) propose a speciﬁc model of expertise involving both moral hazard
in information gathering and adverse selection and show that private communication be-
tween the principal and each of his experts opens the possibility for some vertical collusion
which is harmful for the organization.
The revelation principle with private communication provides a characterization of
implementable allocation by means of non-manipulability constraints. Those constraints
can be interpreted as incentive compatibility constraints with respect to the information
learned by the principal in the course of the mechanism. This is reminiscent of the
posterior implementability concept developed by Green and Laﬀont (1987) in which agents’
equilibrium strategies must be best-responses even after agents learn the information
revealed by the mechanism. However, non-manipulability adds this requirement for the
principal only and not for all parties.
Our characterization of non-manipulable mechanisms by means of a simple Taxation
5Heifetz and Neeman (2006) exhibit conditions under which this conditional independence is generic.
6This might appear as too extreme in view of the recent (mostly) negative results pushed forward
by the ex post implementation literature in interdependent values environments (Dasgupta and Maskin
2000, Perry and Reny 2002 and Jehiel and al. 2006)
7If the aim of the analysis is to model long-run institutions, it is not clear that agents remain in such
high degree of ignorance on each other unless they are also boundedly rational and cannot learn about
others’ types distributions from observing past performances.
8Readers accustomed with the moral hazard literature know that correlation between the agents’
performances may be used to better design incentives without of course voiding the agency problem of
its interest. Our results have the same ﬂavor.
9Their model has only two agents. With more than two agents and in the absence of sub-coalitional
behavior, Che and Kim (2006) showed that correlation can still be used to the principal’s beneﬁts.
5Principle highlights the links between private communication and limited commitment
on the principal’s side. However, in private value settings, private communication does
not interact directly with the agents’ incentives to reveal their information and contrary
to Bester and Strausz (2001) or Krishna and Morgan (2005) we can restrict attention
to direct revealing mechanisms. Actually, private communication endogenizes what is
contractible and what is not because the scope of the nonlinear prices is still deﬁned by
the principal, therefore it puts more structure on limited commitment than assumed in
those two papers.
Similarly, our Taxation Principle is reminiscent of the common agency literature which
has already forcefully stressed the role of nonlinear prices as means of describing feasible
allocations.10 This resemblance comes at no surprise. Under private communication and
centralized mechanism design, the key issue is to prevent the principal’s opportunistic
behavior vis-` a-vis each of his agents. Under common agency, the same kind of oppor-
tunistic behavior occurs, with the common agent reacting to the principals’ oﬀers. In
contrast, there is still a bit of commitment in the game analyzed here in the sense that
the principal ﬁrst chooses the menu of nonlinear prices available to the informed agents.
In a true common agency game, informed agents would be oﬀering mechanisms ﬁrst and
there would be no restriction on possible deviations. Although minor a priori, this diﬀer-
ence between our model and the common agency framework will signiﬁcantly simplify the
analysis. This instilled minimal level of commitment allows us to maintain much of the
optimization techniques available in standard mechanism design without falling into the
diﬃculties faced when characterizing Nash equilibria in the context of multi-contracting
mechanism design.11,12 Once this step is performed, one gets also an important justiﬁ-
cation for what can be mostly viewed as an ad hoc assumption generally made under
common agency: Under complete information, Bernheim and Whinston (1986) suggested
indeed that principals should oﬀer the so-called truthful contributions which are similar
to the “sell-out” contracts implied by non-manipulability.
Our work is also related to the IO literature on bilateral contracting (Hart and Ti-
role (1990), O’Brien and Shaﬀer (1992), McAfee and Schwartz (1994), Segal (1999) and
Segal and Whinston (2003) among others). Those papers analyze complete information
environments with secret bilateral contracting between a principal (manufacturer) and
his agents (retailers). They also focus on some form of opportunism on the principal’s
side coming from the fact that bilateral contracts with agents are secret. Our framework
10Bernheim and Whinston (1986), Stole (1991), Martimort (1992 and 2005), Mezzetti (1997), Marti-
mort and Stole (2002, 2003, 2005), Peters (2001 and 2003). Most often private information is modeled
on the common agent’s side in this literature (an exception is Martimort and Moreira (2005)).
11The most noticeable diﬃculty being of course the multiplicity of equilibria.
12Martimort (2005) discusses this point and argues that one should look for minimal departures of the
centralized mechanism design framework which go towards modelling multi-contracting settings. The
non-manipulability constraint modelled below can precisely be viewed as such a minimal departure.
6diﬀers mostly because of our focus on asymmetric information.
3 The Model
• Preferences and Information: We consider an organization made of one principal
(P) and n agents (Ai for i = 1,...,n). Agent Ai produces a good in quantity qi on the
principal’s behalf. The vector of goods (resp. transfers) is denoted by q = (q1,...,qn)
(resp. t = (t1,...,tn)). By a standard convention, A−i denotes the set of all agents except
Ai and similar notations are used for all other variables. Players have quasi-linear utility
functions deﬁned respectively as:
V (q,t) = ˜ S(q) −
n X
i=1
ti and Ui(q,t) = ti − θiqi.





The eﬃciency parameter θi is Ai’s private information. It belongs to a set Θ = [θ, ¯ θ].
A vector of types is denoted θ = (θ1,...,θn). Types are jointly drawn from the common
knowledge non-negative and atomless density function ˜ f(θ) whose support is Θn. For
future reference, we will also denote the marginal density, the corresponding cumulative




˜ f(θi,θ−i)dθ−i, F(θi) =
Z θi
θ




The principal’s surplus function ˜ S(·) is increasing in each of its arguments qi and
concave in q. For simplicity, ˜ S(·) is also symmetric.
This formulation encompasses three cases of interest to whom we shall devote more
attention in the sequel, specially in the case of two agents:
• Independent projects: ˜ S(·) is separable in both q1 and q2 and thus can be written as
˜ S(q1,q2) = S(q1) + S(q2) for some function S(·) that is increasing and concave with the
Inada condition S0(0) = +∞ and S(0) = 0.
• Perfect substitutability: ˜ S(·) depends on the total production q1 + q2 only: ˜ S(q1,q2) =
S(q1 + q2) for some increasing and concave S(·) still satisfying the above conditions.
• Perfect complementarity: ˜ S(·) can then be written as ˜ S(q1,q2) = S(min(q1,q2)) where
S(·) satisﬁes again the above conditions.
13In the case of independent types, ˜ f(θ) = Πn
i=1f(θi).
7With separable projects, the only externality between agents is informational and
goes through the possible correlation of their cost parameters. This correlation may help
the principal to better design incentives for truthful behavior. Perfect substitutability
arises instead in the context of a procurement auction for an homogenous good. Perfect
complementarity occurs in a team production context.14
• Mechanisms: In standard mechanism design, messages are public, i.e., the report made
by Ai on his type is observed by all agents A−i before the given allocation requested by
the mechanism gets implemented. We focus instead on the case of private communication.
Each agent Ai privately communicates with the principal some message mi. Then, the
principal releases a report ˆ mk
i to any agent Ak (k 6= i) before implementing the requested
transfers and quantity for this agent. Agent Ai observes just the private message mi
that he sends to the principal and the report ˆ m−i he receives from the principal on the
messages m−i the latter has himself received from all the other agents A−i.15
A mechanism is a pair (g(·),M). The outcome function g(·) = (g1(·),...,gn(·)) is
itself a vector of outcome functions. gi(·) maps the communication space M = Πn
i=1Mi
into the set ∆(Qi × Ti) of (possibly random) allocations available for agent Ai. The
outcome function gi(·) associates to any message vector m = (mi, ˆ m−i) from the joint
communication space M = Mi×M−i an output qi(mi, ˆ m−i) and a transfer ti(mi, ˆ m−i) for
agent Ai. When allocations are random, qi(mi, ˆ m−i) and ti(mi, ˆ m−i) should be accordingly
viewed as distributions of outputs and transfers.16
To avoid inferences by Ai on the true report made by agents A−i to the principal just
by checking whether the transfer and output given to those agents are consistent with his
own private report to the principal and the message he received, outputs and transfers
(q−i,t−i) are not observed by Ai. For minimal departure from standard mechanism design,
we keep the assumption that the mechanism (g−i(·),M−i) is observable by Ai.17
With private communication, the principal once informed on an agent’s report might
manipulate this report to extract more from others if he ﬁnds it attractive. Of course,
in the background the Court of Law that can observe the private messages m sent by all
agents to the principal but enforce the allocations contingent on the released messages ˆ m
14By a quick change of set-up, perfect substitutability is also relevant to treat auctions of homogenous
goods while perfect complementarity is relevant for public good problems.
15Note that the principal may a priori send to two diﬀerent agents diﬀerent messages concerning the
report he received from a third one.
16In this case and with obvious notations, payoﬀs should be understood as expectations over those
distributions.
17This assumption plays little role in most of the analysis although it helps presentation. Our results
would be the same under the alternative assumption of secret oﬀers, provided each agent holds passive
beliefs on other agents’ contracts, i.e., does not change his beliefs on the contract received by others when
he himself receives an unexpected oﬀer. Section 9 below investigates a setting with secret oﬀers in a team
context where the agents’ inputs to the organization are perfect complements.
8is corruptible and colludes with the principal. In this sense, our modelling captures a case
for weak institutions where the opacity of transactions leaves scope for that gaming.18,19
• Timing: The contracting game unfolds as follows. First, agents privately learn their
respective eﬃciency parameters. Second, the principal oﬀers a mechanism (g(·),M) to
the agents. Third, all agents simultaneously accept or refuse this mechanism. If agent Ai
refuses, he gets no transfer (ti = 0) and produces nothing (qi = 0) so that he obtains a
payoﬀ normalized to zero. Fourth, agents privately and simultaneously send the vector of
messages m to the principal. Fifth, and this is the novelty of our modelling, the principal
privately reports the messages ˆ m−i to Ai. Finally, the corresponding outputs and transfers
for agent Ai are implemented according to the messages (mi, ˆ m−i).
The equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (thereafter PBE).20
• Benchmark: Let us ﬁrst consider the case of public messages. If types are correlated,
a by-now standard result in the literature is that the ﬁrst-best outcome can be either
achieved (with discrete types) or arbitrarily approached (with a continuum of types). In
sharp contrast with what economic intuition commends, there is no trade-oﬀ between
eﬃciency and rent extraction in such correlated environments. In the case of separable
projects, for instance, the (symmetric) ﬁrst-best output requested from each agent trades
oﬀ the marginal beneﬁt of production against its marginal cost, namely:
S
0(q
FB(θi)) = θi, i = 1,...,n. (1)
When types are instead independently distributed, the ﬁrst-best outcome can no longer be
costlessly implemented. Because asymmetric information gives information rents to the
agents and those rents are viewed as costly by the principal, there is now a genuine trade-
oﬀ between eﬃciency and rent extraction. The marginal beneﬁt of production must be
equal to the virtual marginal cost. With separable projects, the (symmetric) second-best
output is therefore given by the so-called Baron-Myerson outcome21 for each agent:
S
0(q
BM(θi)) = θi +
F(θi)
f(θi)
, i = 1,...,n. (2)






> 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ,
18This limitation of the Court’s power is not speciﬁc to our context. It arises in any model of dynamic
contracting with limited commitment. The Court is also limited there since it cannot enforce long-term
contracts. See Laﬀont and Martimort (2002, Chapter 9) .
19One could think of less extreme situations where each agent may get a signal correlated with what the
others are privately reporting to the principal. Of course, if this signal is public and veriﬁable, contingent
mechanisms could be written to circumvent the privacy problem. However, if this signal is only privately
observed and can be manipulated, such contingent mechanisms lose their force.
20Except in Section 6.2 where we use dominant strategy implementation.
21Baron and Myerson (1982).
9qBM(θi) is indeed the solution.22
This Baron-Myerson outcome is also obtained when the principal contracts separately
with each agent on the basis of the latter’s report only. This would also be the solution
if the principal were a priori restricted to use bilateral contracts with each agent even in
settings with correlated types. If types are correlated, the discrepancy between (1) and (2)
measures then the loss incurred when going from a multilateral contracting environment
to a bilateral contracting one. As a matter of fact, note also that this pair of bilateral
contracts is by deﬁnition non-manipulable.
4 A Simple Example
To get some preliminary insights on the general analysis performed in the sequel, let
us consider a simple example23 where the principal’s ability to manipulate information
signiﬁcantly undermines optimal contracting. A buyer (the principal) wants to procure
one unit of a good from a single seller (the agent). The gross surplus that accrues to the
principal when consuming this unit is S. The seller’s cost may take two values θ ∈ {θ, ¯ θ}




∆θ > S > ¯ θ. (3)
The right-hand side inequality simply means that trade is eﬃcient with both types of
seller under complete information. The left-hand side inequality instead captures the
fact that trade is no longer eﬃcient with the high cost seller when there is asymmetric
information. The buyer makes then an optimal take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the seller at a
price θ. Only an eﬃcient seller accepts this oﬀer and trades.
Let us now suppose that the buyer learns a signal σ ∈ {θ, ¯ θ} on the agent’s type
ex post, i.e., once the agent has already reported his cost parameter. This signal is
informative on the agent’s type and more speciﬁcally
proba{σ = θ|θ} = proba{σ = ¯ θ|¯ θ} = ρ >
1
2
> proba{σ = θ|¯ θ} = proba{σ = ¯ θ|θ} = 1 − ρ.
Let assume that σ is publicly veriﬁable. The price paid by the buyer for one unit of
the good depends in full generality both of the seller’s report on his cost and the realized
value of the signal. Let denote by t(θ,σ) this price.
22Otherwise, bunching may arise at the optimal contract. See Guesnerie and Laﬀont (1984) and Laﬀont
and Martimort (2002, Chapter 3) for instance.
23This example is in the spirit of Riordan and Sappington (1988) where correlated information on an
agent’s type is not produced by another agent’s report but by an exogenous information system.
10Looking for prices that implement the ﬁrst-best production decision, incentive com-
patibility for both types of seller requires now respectively:
ρt(θ,θ) + (1 − ρ)t(θ, ¯ θ) ≥ ρt(¯ θ,θ) + (1 − ρ)t(¯ θ, ¯ θ)
(1 − ρ)t(¯ θ,θ) + ρt(¯ θ, ¯ θ) ≥ (1 − ρ)t(θ,θ) + ρt(θ, ¯ θ).
Normalizing at zero the seller’s outside opportunities, the respective participation con-
straints of both types (assuming that both types produce) can be written as:
ρt(θ,θ) + (1 − ρ)t(θ, ¯ θ) − θ ≥ 0
(1 − ρ)t(¯ θ,θ) + ρt(¯ θ, ¯ θ) − ¯ θ ≥ 0.
From Riordan and Sappington (1988), we know that the buyer can extract all surplus
from the seller and implement the ﬁrst-best outcome by properly designing transfers.








t(θ, ¯ θ) = −
1 − ρ
2ρ − 1
¯ θ < 0, t(¯ θ, ¯ θ) =
ρ
2ρ − 1
¯ θ > ¯ θ > 0.
This mechanism punishes the seller whenever his report conﬂicts with the public signal.
Otherwise the seller is rewarded and paid more than his marginal cost.
Consider now the case where the principal privately observes σ. The price scheme
above can no longer be used since it is manipulable. Once the seller has already reported
his type, the buyer may want to claim that he receives conﬂicting evidence on the agent’s
report to pocket the corresponding punishment instead of giving the reward. To avoid
those manipulations by the principal, the price must be independent of the realized signal:
t(θ,θ) = t(θ, ¯ θ) ∀θ ∈ {θ, ¯ θ}.
With this non-manipulability constraint, we are back to the traditional screening model
without ex post information. Given (3), trade only occurs with an eﬃcient seller.
This simple example illustrates the consequences of having the principal manipulate
information which, if otherwise public, would be used for screening purposes. In the
sequel, information is no longer exogenously produced but is learned from contracting
with another agent who, in equilibrium, reports truthfully his type. Second, the non-
manipulability is derived rather than assumed. Moreover, and again in sharp contrast
with the above example where output was ﬁxed (one unit of the good had to be produced
irrespectively of the observed/reported signal σ), the non-manipulability of a mechanism
by the principal may require distorting both outputs and transfers.
24Those prices are obtained when all incentive and participation constraints are binding.
115 Revelation and Taxation Principles with Private
Communication
5.1 Revelation Principle
Let us come back to our general model. To start the analysis, we provide a full character-
ization of the set of allocations that can be achieved as PBEs of the overall contracting
game where the principal ﬁrst oﬀers a private communication mechanism (g(·),M) (using
a priori any arbitrary communication space M) and, second, may then manipulate the
report of an agent when releasing that report to each other agent.
For any agents’ reporting strategy m∗(·) = (m∗
1(·),...,m∗
n(·)), supm∗(·) denotes the
support of the strategies, i.e., the set of messages m that are sent with strictly positive
probability given m∗(·).
For a ﬁxed mechanism (g(·),M), let us deﬁne the continuation PBEs that such mech-
anism induce as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 : A continuation PBE for any arbitrary mechanism (g(·),M) is a triplet
{m∗(·), ˆ m∗(·),dµ(θ|m)} such that:
• The agents’ strategy vector m∗(θ) = (m∗
1(θ1),...,m∗
n(θn)) from Θn into M = Πn
i=1Mi
forms a Bayesian equilibrium given the principal’s manipulation strategy ˆ m∗(·)
m
∗
















• The principal’s posterior beliefs dµ(θ|m) on the agents’ types follow Bayes’s rule
whenever possible (i.e., when m ∈ supm∗(·)) and are arbitrary otherwise.




















Given a mechanism (g(·),M), a continuation PBE {m∗(·), ˆ m∗(·),dµ(θ|m)} induces an
allocation a = g ◦ ˆ m∗ ◦ m∗ which maps Θn onto ∆(Q × T ).
12Deﬁnition 2 : A mechanism (g(·),M) is non-manipulable if and only if ˆ m∗(m) = m,
for all m ∈ supm∗(·) at a continuation PBE.25
Deﬁnition 3 : A direct mechanism (¯ g(·),Θn) is truthful if and only if m∗(θ) = θ, for
all θ ∈ Θ at a continuation PBE.
We are now ready to state:
Proposition 1 : The Revelation Principle with Private Communication. Any
allocation a(·) achieved at a continuation PBE of any arbitrary mechanism (g(·),M)
with private communication can also be implemented as a truthful and non-manipulable
continuation PBE of a direct mechanism (¯ g(·),Θn).




(ti(θi,θ−i) − θiqi(θi,θ−i)|θi) ≥ E
θ−i

ti(ˆ θi,θ−i) − θiqi(ˆ θi,θ−i)|θi

∀(θi, ˆ θi) ∈ Θ
2. (6)
The following non-manipulability constraints stipulate that the principal will not misrep-








∀(θ1, ˆ θ−1,...,θn, ˆ θ−n) ∈ (Θ × Θ
n−1)
n. (7)
Those constraints just say that ex post, i.e., once he has learned the private reports of both
agents, the principal does not want to manipulate those reports when he publicly releases
them. The principal’s ex post payoﬀ should be maximized with a truthful strategy.
In the sequel, we analyze the impact of the non-manipulability constraint (7) on op-
timal mechanisms in diﬀerent contexts.
5.2 Taxation Principle
Beforehand, we propose an alternative formulation of the problem which clariﬁes the im-
pact of private communication and uncovers a link between our analysis and the common
agency literature. We show below that non-manipulable mechanisms can equivalently be
implemented through the following three-stage modiﬁed common agency game:
25Note that our concept of non-manipulability is weak and that we do not impose the more stringent
requirement that the mechanism is non-manipulable at all continuation PBEs.
13• At stage 1, the principal oﬀers menus of nonlinear prices {Ti(qi, ˆ θi)}ˆ θi∈Θ which stipulate a
payment for agent Ai as a function of how much he produces and which type he reports.26
• At stage 2, agents report simultaneously and non-cooperatively their types and thus
pick schedules among the oﬀered menus. Each agent chooses truthfully the schedule
corresponding to his own type.
• At stage 3, the principal chooses how much output to request from each agent.
Replacing direct mechanisms with menus of nonlinear prices is the essence of the stan-
dard Taxation Principle even in multi-agent environments.27 The speciﬁc point here is the
principal’s non-commitment which is encapsulated in the game form above. The principal
optimally chooses the agents’ outputs ex post conditionally on what he has learned from
observing which nonlinear price each agent respectively picked. These outputs lie within
the range of outputs speciﬁed by these nonlinear prices. This aspect of the game is clearly
reminiscent of the common agency literature where the player at the nexus of all contracts
optimally reacts to the others’ choices. However, and in sharp contrast, there is still a
bit of commitment here since the principal initially chooses the menu of nonlinear prices
available to the informed agents. In common agency games, the informed agents would be
playing ﬁrst and there would be no a priori restriction in their possible deviations. Here
such restrictions are implicit in the fact that the principal already designs the available
menu of possible schemes from which agents choose.
Proposition 2 : The Taxation Principle.
• Any allocation a(θ) achieved at a continuation PBE of a non-manipulable direct Bayesian
mechanism (¯ g(·),Θ) with private communication can alternatively be implemented as a
continuation PBE of a modiﬁed common agency game which requires each agent Ai to
choose truthfully a nonlinear price from menus {Ti(qi, ˆ θi)}ˆ θi∈Θ and then the principal to
choose outputs.
• Conversely, any allocation a(θ) achieved at a continuation PBE of a modiﬁed com-
mon agency game which has agents choosing truthfully nonlinear prices from menus
{Ti(qi, ˆ θi)}ˆ θi∈Θ and then the principal choosing outputs can alternatively be implemented as
a truthful continuation PBE of a non-manipulable direct Bayesian mechanism (¯ g(·),Θn)
with private communication.
Proposition 2 shows the exact nature of the non-manipulability constraint: The principal
can commit to the nonlinear prices used to reward the agents but cannot commit to a rule
26To simplify exposition, we focus on the case of deterministic menus. The case where the principal
proposes a menu of measures over price-output allocations can be addressed similarly.
27Rochet (1985).
14stipulating the agents’ outputs as a function of the whole vector of reports. He will choose
these outputs ex post once the agents have revealed their types by choosing within the
proposed menus. Of course, those nonlinear prices are designed in an incentive compati-
ble way. More complex mechanisms are manipulable and are not credibly oﬀered by the
opportunistic principal. The Taxation Principle above also shows that non-manipulability
does not necessarily imply bilateral contracting. Picking outputs q after agents have cho-




To familiarize ourselves with the non-manipulability constraint, let us start with the
simplest case where only two agents work on projects without any production externality.





Written in terms of direct mechanisms, the non-manipulability constraint (7) gives the
existence of an arbitrary function hi(θi) such that:
S(qi(θi,θ−i)) − ti(θi,θ−i) = hi(θi) (8)
Equation (8) shows that each agent is made residual claimant for the part of the principal’s
objective function which is directly related to his own output. The nonlinear price which
achieves this objective is a sell-out contract:
Ti(q,θi) = S(q) − hi(θi). (9)
Everything happens thus as if agent Ai had to pay upfront an amount hi(θi) to produce
on the principal’s behalf. Then, the agent enjoys all returns S(q) on the project he is
running for the principal. The principal’s payoﬀ in his relationship with Ai is hi(θi) and
this payoﬀ does not depend on the amount produced. Of course, ﬁxed-fees are adapted
so that participation by all types is ensured.
Let us denote by Ui(θi) the information rent of an agent Ai with type θi:
Ui(θi) = E
θ−i
(S(qi(θi,θ−i)) − θiqi(θi,θ−i)|θi) − hi(θi). (10)
Individual rationality implies:
Ui(θi) ≥ 0 ∀i, ∀θi ∈ Θ. (11)
15Bayesian incentive compatibility can be written as:





S(qi(ˆ θi,θ−i)) − θiqi(ˆ θi,θ−i)|θi

− hi(ˆ θi) ∀i, ∀θi ∈ Θ. (12)
What is remarkable here is the similarity of this formula with the Bayesian incentive con-
straint that would be obtained had types been independently distributed. In that case,
the agent’s expected payment is independent of his true type and can also be separated in
the expression of the incentive constraint exactly as the function hi(·) in (12). This sim-
ilarity makes the analysis of the set of non-manipulable incentive compatible allocations
look similar to that with independent types.
Assuming diﬀerentiability of qi(·),28 simple revealed preferences arguments show that
hi(·) is itself diﬀerentiable. The local ﬁrst-order condition for Bayesian incentive compat-
ibility becomes thus:29









∀i, ∀θi ∈ Θ; (13)
Consider thus any output schedule qi(·) which is monotonically decreasing in θi and which
lies below the ﬁrst-best. From (13), hi(·) is necessarily also decreasing in θi. In other
words, less eﬃcient types are requested to pay lower up-front payments. The Bayesian
incentive constraint (13) captures then the trade-oﬀ faced by an agent with type θi.
By exaggerating his type, this agent pays a lower up-front payment. However, he also
produces less and enjoys a lower expected surplus. Incentive compatibility is achieved
when those two eﬀects just compensate each other.
To highlight the trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and rent extraction, it is useful to rewrite
incentive compatibility in terms of the agents’ information rent. Equation (13) becomes:











To better understand the right-hand side of (14), consider an agent with type θi willing
to mimic a less eﬃcient type θi +dθi. By doing so, this agent produces the same amount
than this less eﬃcient type at a lower marginal cost. This gives a ﬁrst source of information




Note that this source of rent arises whether there is correlation or not.
28Because conditional expectations depend on Ai’s type, one cannot also derive from revealed prefer-
ences arguments that qi(·) is itself monotonically decreasing in θi.
29We postpone the analysis of the global incentive compatibility constraints to the Appendix.
16By mimicking this less eﬃcient type, type θi aﬀects also how the principal interprets
the information contained in the other agent’s report to adjust θi’s own production. The










This second source of rent is harder to explain a priori and may in fact be either positive
or negative. More intuition will be provided on this eﬀect when we derive the optimal
mechanism.




















∀i = 1,2, ∀θi ∈ Θ. (15)








S(qi(θ)) − θiqi(θ) − Ui(θi)
!
subject to constraints (11) to (15).
To get sharp predictions on the solution, we need to generalize to environments with
correlated information the well-known assumption of monotonicity of the virtual cost:
Assumption 1 Monotonicity of the generalized virtual cost:








is always non-negative, strictly increasing in θi and decreasing in θ−i.
This assumption ensures that optimal outputs are non-increasing with own types, a con-
dition which is neither suﬃcient nor necessary for implementability as it can be seen from
(15) but which remains a useful ingredient for it. Assumption 1 is related to the following
three other assumptions:
17Assumption 2 Weak correlation:30
˜ fθi(θ−i|θi) is close enough to zero, for all θ ∈ Θ2.







> 0 for all θi ∈ Θ.







≥ 0 for all θ ∈ Θ2.
This last assumption is in fact implied by Assumption 1. Assumptions 3 and 4 are
standard in Incentive Theory. They help to build intuition on some of the results below.
Proposition 3 : Unrelated Projects. Assume that Assumptions 1 and 2 both hold.
The optimal non-manipulable Bayesian mechanism entails:




SB(θ)) = ϕ(θi,θ−i), (16)








• Agents always get a positive rent except for the least eﬃcient ones
U
SB
i (θi) ≥ 0 (with = 0 at θi = ¯ θ).
30We have also analyzed the case of a strong correlation for a model with discrete types. If correlation
is strong enough, the non-manipulability constraints have less bite and the ﬁrst-best can still be costlessly
achieved in the limit of a very strong correlation. Results are available upon request.
18As already stressed, there is a strong similarity between incentive constraints for
a non-manipulable Bayesian mechanism and for independent types without the non-
manipulability constraint. This similarity suggests that the trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency
and rent extraction that occurs under independent types carries over in our context even
with correlation. This intuition is conﬁrmed by equation (16) which highlights the output
distortion capturing this trade-oﬀ even with correlation.
With independent types, the right-hand sides of (2) and (16) are the same. The
principal ﬁnds useless the report of one agent to better design the other’s incentives. He
must give up some information rent to induce information revelation anyway. Outputs are
accordingly distorted downward to reduce those rents and the standard Baron-Myerson
distortions follow. The important point to notice is that the optimal multilateral contract
with separable projects and independent types can be implemented with a pair of bilateral
contracts which are de facto non-manipulable by the principal. The non-manipulability
constraint has no bite in this case.
When types are instead correlated, the agents’ rent can be (almost) fully extracted in
this context with a continuum of types31 and the ﬁrst-best output can be implemented
at no cost with a mechanism that relies on public communication. Of course, this result
relies on the use of complex lotteries linking an agent’s payment to what the other reports.
Those schemes are manipulable and thus no longer used with private communication.
A similar logic to that of Section 4 applies here with an added twist. Indeed, in our
earlier example, non-manipulability constraints put only a restriction on transfers since
output was ﬁxed at one unit. When output may also vary, non-manipulability constraints
impose only that the principal’s payoﬀ remains constant over all possible transfer-output
pairs that he oﬀers to an agent. This still allows the principal to link agent Ai’s payment to
what he learns from agent A−i’s report as long as Ai’s output varies accordingly. Doing so,
the principal may still be able to incorporate some of the beneﬁts of correlated information
in the design of contracts. The multilateral contract signed with both agents performs
better than a pair of bilateral contracts because retaining control on the quantity produced
by each agent allows the principal to still somewhat exploit informational externalities.
To understand the nature of the output distortions and the role of the correlation, it
is useful to compare the solution found in (16) with the standard Baron-Myerson formula
(2) which corresponds also to the optimal mechanism had the principal contracted sep-
arately with each agent. As already noticed, this pair of bilateral contracts is of course
non-manipulable since each agent’s output and payment depend only on his own type.
Whether communication is public or private does not matter. Let us see how those bilat-
eral contracts aﬀect the agents’ information rent. Using (14), we observe that the second
31McAfee and Reny (1992).









By departing from the Baron-Myerson outcome, one aﬀects this second term and reduces
the agent’s information rent. Think now of the principal as using A−i’s report to improve
his knowledge of agent Ai’s type. Suppose that the principal starts from the bilateral
Baron-Myerson contract with Ai but slightly modiﬁes it to improve rent extraction once
he has learned A−i’s type. By using a “maximum likelihood estimator,” the principal
should infer how likely it is that Ai lies on his type by simply observing A−i’s report.
From Assumption 4 and condition (17), there exists θ∗
−i(θi) such that
˜ fθi(θ−i|θi)
˜ f(θ−i|θi) ≥ 0 if and
only if θ−i ≥ θ∗
−i(θi). Hence, the principal’s best estimate of Ai’s type is θi if he learns
from A−i, θ−i = θ∗
−i(θi). Nothing a priori unknown has been learned from A−i’s report in
that case. The only principal’s concern remains reducing the ﬁrst-term on the right-hand
side of (14). The optimal output for θi is still equal to the Baron-Myerson solution.
Think now of an observation θ−i > θ∗
−i(θi). Because Assumption 4 holds, it is much
likely that the principal infers that Ai is less eﬃcient than what it pretends to be. Such
signal let the principal think that the agent has not exaggerated his cost parameter and
there is less need for distorting output. The distortion with respect to the ﬁrst-best
outcome is less than in the Baron-Myerson solution. Instead, a signal θ−i < θ∗
−i(θi)
is more likely to conﬁrm the agent’s report if he exaggerates his type. Curbing these
incentives requires increasing further the distortion beyond the Baron-Myerson solution.




BM(θi) ⇔ θ−i ≥ θ
∗
−i(θi) ∀θi ∈ Θ.
Remark 1: With correlated types it is no longer true that the local second-order condition
(15) is always suﬃcient to guarantee global incentive compatibility even if the agents’
utility function satisﬁes the Spence-Mirrlees condition. However, Assumption 2 ensures
that the mechanism identiﬁed in Proposition 3 is globally incentive compatible so that
our approach remains valid.32
Remark 2: To get a simpler design of the optimal mechanism, we might impose also the
following property:
Assumption 5 Best-Predictor Property (BPP):
˜ fθi(θi|θi) = 0.
32See the Appendix for details.
20Given the report made by A−i, the most likely type for Ai is this report itself. With this
property, the optimal output equals the Baron-Myerson outcome only when reports are
the same (i.e., θi = θ∗
−i(θi).)
6.2 Dominant Strategy and Bilateral Contracting
The previous section has shown that some form of multilateral contracting remains opti-
mal even with non-manipulability. We now strengthen the implementation concept and
require that agents play dominant strategies in the mechanism oﬀered by the principal.
We ask then whether such strengthening makes multilateral contracts look more like a
set of disjoint bilateral contracts.
The notions of private communication and non-manipulability are independent of the
implementation concept used to describe the agents’ behavior. Our framework can be
straightforwardly adapted to dominant strategy implementation. For any arbitrary mech-
anism (g(·),M), a dominant strategy continuation equilibrium is then deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 4 : A continuation dominant strategy equilibrium is a triplet {m∗(·), ˆ m∗(·),dµ(θ|m)}
such that:
• m∗(θ) = (m∗
1(θ1),...,m∗
n(θn)) from Θn into M = Πn
i=1Mi forms a dominant strategy
equilibrium given the principal’s manipulation strategy ˆ m∗(·)
m
∗








• The principal’s posterior beliefs on the agents’ types are derived following Bayes’s
rule whenever possible (i.e., when m ∈ supm∗(·)) and are arbitrary otherwise.
• The principal’s manipulation ˆ m∗(·) = (ˆ m−1,..., ˆ m−n) from Πn
i=1M−i onto satisﬁes
(5).
We immediately adapt our previous ﬁndings to get:
Proposition 4 : The Revelation Principle for Dominant Strategy Implemen-
tation with Private Communication. Any allocation a(·) achieved at a dominant
strategy equilibrium of any arbitrary mechanism (g(·),M) with private communication
can alternatively be implemented as a truthful and non-manipulable dominant strategy
equilibrium of a direct mechanism (¯ g(·),Θn).
21Under dominant strategy implementation and in the case of separable projects, non-
manipulability is still obtained with sell-out contracts:
ti(θi,θ−i) = S(qi(θi,θ−i)) − hi(θi).
Denoting ui(θi,θ−i) = ti(θi,θ−i) − θiqi(θi,θ−i) the ex post rent received by an agent with
type θi when the other agent reports being θ−i, dominant strategy incentive compatibility
amounts to the following implementability conditions:
qi(θi,θ−i) weakly decreasing in θi, for all θ−i,
and




We also strengthen the participation condition and impose ex post participation con-
straints which hold irrespectively of the agents’ beliefs on each other types:
ui(θi,θ−i) ≥ 0, ∀(θi,θ−i) ∈ Θ
2.
Proposition 5 Under dominant strategy implementation and ex post participation, the
optimal non-manipulable mechanism can be achieved with a pair of bilateral contracts
implementing the Baron-Myerson outcome for each agent, (tBM
i (θi),qBM
i (θi)) such that
t
BM








With dominant strategy and non-manipulability, informational externalities can no
longer be exploited and the principal cannot do better than oﬀering bilateral contracts.
Therefore, the Baron-Myerson outcome becomes optimal even with correlated types.
Remark 3: Bilateral contracts are suboptimal if we do not impose non-manipulability
even under dominant strategy implementation and ex post participation. Insisting only on
dominant strategy and ex post participation, the optimal quantities are given by Baron-
Myerson formulae using nevertheless the fact that the principal uses the correlation of
types to update his beliefs accordingly. We get:
S
0(qi(θi,θ−i)) = θi +
˜ F(θi | θ−i)
˜ f(θi | θ−i)
. (20)
The optimal mechanism without the non-manipulability constraint yields a strictly higher
payoﬀ than a pair of bilateral contracts when types are correlated. Non-manipulability
and dominant strategy implementability are clearly two diﬀerent concepts with quite
diﬀerent implications. One restriction does not imply the other. These restrictions justify
simple bilateral contracts only when taken in tandem.
227 Characterizing Non-Manipulability
With independent projects, the non-manipulability constraints are easily separable in the
agents’ identities and it was straightforward to derive from those constraints the form of
non-manipulable mechanisms. With more general surplus functions ˜ S(·), it is no longer
possible to isolate eacily the consequences of non-manipulability on each agent’s schedules.
We now propose a general approach that enables us to derive second-best distortions in
those more general environments. For simplicity, we still focus on the case of two agents
only.
Using again the Taxation Principle derived in Proposition 2, non-manipulability con-







This formulation in terms of nonlinear prices is attractive since the optimality conditions
above look very much like an incentive compatibility constraint on the principal’s side.
Keeping q−i as ﬁxed, the optimality condition satisﬁed by qi is the same as that one
should write to induce this principal to publicly reveal his private information q−i. This
remark being made, one can proceed as usual in mechanism design and characterize
direct revelation mechanisms {ti(ˆ q−i|θi);qi(ˆ q−i|θi)}ˆ q−i∈Q which induce truthful revelation
of the piece of private information ˆ q−i. Of course, this parameter is not exogenously
given as in standard adverse selection problem but is derived endogenously from the
equilibrium behavior. Starting then from such direct revelation mechanism, we can use
standard techniques and reconstruct a non-manipulable nonlinear price Ti(qi,θi) by simply
“eliminating” ˆ q−i from the expressions obtained for ti(ˆ q−i|θi) and qi(ˆ q−i|θi).
Lemma 1 Suppose the implemented quantity schedules are continuous. The direct rev-
elation mechanism {ti(ˆ q−i|θi);qi(ˆ q−i|θi)}ˆ q−i∈Q associated to a non-manipulable nonlinear
price Ti(qi,θi) is such that:
• qi(q−i|θi) is monotonically increasing (resp. decreasing) in q−i and thus a.e. diﬀer-
entiable when the agents’ eﬀorts are complements, i.e., ∂2 ˜ S
∂q1∂q2 > 0, (resp. substitutes,
i.e., ∂2 ˜ S
∂q1∂q2 < 0).










23• Consider any diﬀerentiability point where
∂qi
∂q−i(q−i|θi) 6= 0 and denote ˜ q−i(qi,θi)
the inverse function of qi(q−i|θi). The non-manipulable nonlinear price Ti(qi,θi) is






(qi, ˜ q−i(qi,θi)). (23)






(x, ˜ q−i(x,θi))dx − Hi(θi) (24)
where Hi(θi) is some arbitrary function. Of course, in equilibrium, conjectures must be
correct and we should have ˜ q−i(qi(θ),θi) = q−i(θ) ∀θ.
Equation (23) is rather general and can be used to recover some important polar cases:
•Independent Projects: This case is straightforward since ∂ ˜ S
∂x(x, ˜ q−i(x,θi)) = S0(x). Direct
integration of (24) yields (9).
• Perfect Substitutability: Suppose that ˜ S(q1,q2) = S(q1 +q2) so that the agents’ outputs
are perfect substitutes as in the case of a multi-unit auction with the winner taking all
market shares.33 Then, let us conjecture that ˜ q−i(x,θi) = 0 when x > 0, i.e., an agent
produces a positive output only if the other does not. Non-manipulable nonlinear prices
are again given by sell-out contracts:
Ti(qi,θi) = S(qi) − Hi(θi) (25)
where Hi(θi) is some arbitrary function.










(x, ˜ q−i(x, ˆ θi))dx − θiqi(ˆ θi,θ−i)|θi
!
− Hi(ˆ θi). (26)
From this we can derive the optimal second-best distortions:
Proposition 6 Assume that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and that ˜ S(·) is strictly concave




SB(θ)) = ϕ(θi,θ−i), (27)
provided qSB
i (θ) is non-increasing in θi and non-decreasing (resp. non-increasing) in θ−i
if outputs are substitutes (resp. complements) as requested by Lemma 1.
33This case will be studied with more details in Section 8 below.
24This is again a generalized Baron-Myerson formula. The marginal beneﬁt of the activity
undertaken by one agent is equal to his generalized virtual cost.
Remark 4: With more than two agents, the diﬃculty is that each nonlinear price must
screen a multidimensional vector of private information. This issue is left for further
research.
Remark 5: As an example, consider the following surplus function for the principal:








− λ(q1 − q2)
2
for some parameter µ > 0 and λ > 0 so that optimal outputs remain non-negative. Using
(27) above, it is straightforward to check that, in the limiting case of λ very large, i.e.,
when the agents’ outputs are almost perfect complements for the principal, both agents
produce the same amount given by:
q
SB(θ) = µ −
1
2
(ϕ(θi,θ−i) + ϕ(θ−i,θi)). (28)
The principal’s marginal beneﬁt of production is equal to the sum of the agents’ gener-
alized virtual costs. In Section 9 below, we will give up this limit argument and tackle
directly the case of a team production process under diﬀerent assumptions on the amount
of public information.
8 Multi-Unit Auctions
Auction design provides a nice area of application of our theory. The private communica-
tion hypothesis seems indeed quite relevant to study auctions organized on the internet.
In light of the recent development of such trading mechanisms, it is certainly a major
objective to extend auction theory in that direction.34 We now adapt the general frame-
work of Section 7 to a multi-unit auction framework. Doing so raises new issues coming
from the fact that the principal’s objective is no longer strictly concave in (q1,q2). The
principal’s gross surplus from consuming q = q1 + q2 units of the good can be written as
S(q) where S0(0) = +∞, S0 > 0, S00 < 0 and S(0) = 0. 35
Proposition 7 : Assume that Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 hold. The optimal non-
manipulable multi-unit auction mechanism entails:
34The private communication hypothesis is also a consistent way to give a more active role to the
auctioneer and build a general model of “shill bidding.”
35The Inada condition ensures that it is always optimal to induce a positive production even in the
second-best environment that we consider so that the issue of ﬁnding an upper bound on the set of types
who may actually produce no longer arises. For the case of unit-auctions and the characterization of the
reserve price in this case, see Dequiedt and Martimort (2006a).




SB(θ)) = ϕ(θi,θ−i) for θ−i ≥ θi (29)
with qSB(θi,θi) = qBM(θi);
• The optimal mechanism is an all-pay auction. The agents’ payment is deﬁned as
T
SB(q,θi) = S(q) − h





















Several features of the optimal auction are worth to be stressed. First, the optimal multi-
unit auction is eﬃcient in our symmetric environment; the right to produce is given to
the most eﬃcient agent. Second, conditionally on winning, the agent produces an output
which is modiﬁed to take into account what the principal learns from the losing agent’s
report. However, output distortions are always less than in the Baron-Myerson outcome.
Indeed, the mere fact that an agent wins the auction conveys only “good news” to the
principal; the losing agent’s cost parameter is always greater. Third, the principal oﬀers a
menu of (symmetric) nonlinear schedules which are sell-out contracts from which agents
pick their most preferred choices. The agent having revealed the lowest cost parameter
produces all output accordingly in this winner-takes-all context. Finally, even the losing
agent pays an entry fee although he does not produce himself. The optimal mechanism
is an all-pay auction.
9 Team Production
In a team context, agents provide eﬀorts which are perfect complements in the production
process. We will denote by q = min(q1,q2) the organization’s output and by S(q) the
principal’s beneﬁt from producing q units of output. We assume also that S0(0) = +∞,
S0 > 0, S00 < 0 with S(0) = 0.36
As a benchmark, consider the case where types are independently distributed. Then,
both agents produce the same amount and the marginal beneﬁt of such production
36The Inada condition again ensures that it is worth always contracting with both agents so that the
issue of “shutting-down” the worst types does not arise.










More generally, for a given output schedule q(·) oﬀered to the agents, we rewrite the
non-manipulability constraints (7) as:









ti(θi, ˆ θ−i). (32)
With perfect complementarity, it is natural to look for incentive schemes such that both
the agents’ eﬀorts and payments are non-increasing in both types. Then, the principal
has a priori no incentives to lie to either agent in such a way that this agent produces
more eﬀort than the ﬁnal output. This is captured by the following constraint on possible
lies:
q1(θ1, ˆ θ2) = q2(ˆ θ1,θ2). (33)
Alternatively, imposing such an equality can also be justiﬁed when contracts can only
be contingent on the output of the organization and not on individual inputs.37 Using
the formulation in terms of nonlinear prices proposed in Proposition 2, the organization






In Section 7 where agents produced diﬀerent inputs, the non-manipulability constraints
did not link their nonlinear prices altogether and (24) allowed to derive the non-manipulable
nonlinear prices for each agent separately. Clearly, this is no longer the case with (34).
This non-separability of the non-manipulability constraint raises some issues. If we were
keeping the assumption that the oﬀer T−i(·,θ−i) made by the principal to A−i was ob-
served by Ai, it could indeed be used to directly aﬀect also Ai’s oﬀer and thus his own
incentive constraint. To simplify, we thus assume now that Ai does not observe T−i(q,θ−i)
but of course perfectly anticipates this oﬀer in equilibrium. By doing so, there is no way
in which the principal can directly aﬀect the design of the contract with one agent to
relax the incentive constraint of the other. As usual in the literature on secret contract
oﬀers, we also assume passive beliefs out of the equilibrium path, i.e., agent Ai does not
37This additional requirement reinstalls some sort of public information that could be used to discipline
the principal via the use of highly discontinuous schedules. Therefore, to exploit equation (32), we shall
restrict attention to admissible manipulations verifying (33) and to continuous quantity schedules q(·).
Whether the principal can use discontinuous schedules to relax the non-manipulability constraint (32) is
an important question that we leave for future research.
27change his beliefs on A−i’s scheme if he himself receives an oﬀer diﬀerent from that he
expects in equilibrium.38
Guided by the intuition built in Section 7, the nonlinear price Ti(q,θi) can still be
recovered from a direct revelation mechanism that would now induce the principal to
reveal everything not known by Ai to this agent. Ai correctly infers in equilibrium A−i’s
own contract and all information unknown to Ai amounts only to A−i’s type.
When designing a nonlinear schedule Ti(q,θi) to extract the principal’s endogenous
information on A−i, one must take into account that Ai forms conjectures on the equi-
librium output qe(θ1,θ2) and the nonlinear price T e
−i(q,θ−i) oﬀered to A−i (which is also
non-observable by Ai here). Let deﬁne φ−i(θi,q) such that q = qe(θi,φ−i(θi,q)). Of course,
at equilibrium expectations are correct and we have φ−i(θi,q(θ)) = θ−i ∀θ.













dx − H(θi) (35)
where H(θi) is some arbitrary function.39
To characterize the optimal non-manipulable mechanism, we proceed as in the previous
sections and ﬁnd:
Proposition 8 : When Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, there exists an optimal non-manipulable
mechanism for the team which entails:







as long as qSB(θ1,θ2) is decreasing in both arguments;





SB(θi,θ−i),θi) = ϕ(θi,θ−i) (37)
which is non-decreasing in θi and non-increasing in θ−i.
38Segal (1999) for instance.
39The class of mechanisms satisfying (35) is non-empty. It contains for instance the separable nonlinear
prices T(q,θ) of the form T(q,θ) = 1
2S(q) − h(θ), where h(·) is some arbitrary function.
28• Both agents always get a positive information rent except when ineﬃcient
U
SB(θi) ≥ 0 (with = 0 at θi = ¯ θ only).
The logic is very similar to that made earlier although the output distortions diﬀer
somewhat due to the speciﬁcities of the team problem. The marginal beneﬁt of production
is now equal to the sum of generalized virtual costs.
Non-manipulability constraints also require that each agent’s payment make him some-
what internalize the principal’s objective function. Because of the team problem, each
agent can only partially internalize the principal’s objective and his marginal payment
is only a fraction of the principal’s marginal beneﬁt of production. Equation (37) shows
that the marginal reward to agent Ai decreases as A−i (resp. Ai) becomes less (resp.
more) eﬃcient. As a consequence, the agents’ shares of the production process reﬂect
their relative eﬃciency.
In this team production framework, the output distortions necessary to reduce both
agents’ information rents must be compounded as it can be seen on (36) which generalizes
the limiting case found on a particular example in (28). Also using (36), we observe that
the optimal output converges towards the solution (31) as correlation diminishes. This
conﬁrms that non-manipulability constraints have no bite in the limit of no correlation.
10 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the consequences of relaxing the assumption of public com-
munication in an otherwise standard mechanism design environment. Doing so paves
the way to a tractable theory which responds to some of the most often heard criticisms
addressed to the mechanism design methodology. Even in correlated information envi-
ronments, considering the non-manipulability of mechanisms restores a genuine trade-oﬀ
between eﬃciency and rent extraction which leads to a standard second-best analysis.
In several environments of interest (separable projects, auctions, team production, more
general production externalities), we analyzed this trade-oﬀ and characterized optimal
non-manipulable mechanisms.
Each of these particular settings certainly deserves further studies either by specializ-
ing the information structure, by generalizing preferences or by focusing on organizational
problems coming from the analysis of real world institutions in particular contexts (po-
litical economy, regulation, vertical restraints in a IO context, etc..).
Of particular importance may be the extension of our framework to the case of auctions
with interdependent valuations and/or common values. Our approach for simplifying
29mechanisms could be an attractive alternative to the somewhat too demanding ex post
implementation pushed forward by the recent vintage of the literature on that topic. More
generally, the analysis of non-manipulable trading mechanisms in correlated environments
deserves further analysis. We conjecture that simple institutions like market mechanisms
will perform extremely well if one insists on non-manipulability.40
Non-manipulable public good mechanisms may also be attractive as a way out of the
following paradox. Indeed, without this constraint, the celebrated free-riding problem
arises in large populations with independent types. However, the ﬁrst-best is costlessly
achieved as soon as there is a little bit of correlation among agents.41 Non-manipulability
of public good mechanisms opens the possibility of less stark second-best analysis.
Introducing a bias in the principal’s preferences towards either agent could also raise
interesting issues. First by making the principal’s objective function somewhat congruent
with that of one of the agents, one goes towards a simple modelling of vertical collusion
and favoritism. Second, this congruence may introduce interesting aspects related to the
common values element that arises in such environment and that have been set aside by
our focus on a private values setting.
Also, it would be worth investigating what is the scope for horizontal collusion between
the agents in the environments depicted in this paper. Indeed, since an agent’s output and
information rents still depend on what the other claims, there is still scope for collusion
in Bayesian environments whereas relying on dominant and non-manipulable mechanisms
obviously destroys this possibility. Considering collusion may also justify the constraint
on private communication in the ﬁrst place. Indeed, privacy may make it diﬃcult to
enforce collusive agreements between agents compared to the case of public information.
This could lead to an interesting trade-oﬀ between the cost of the principal’s opportunism
under private communication and the facilitated collusion under public communication.
In practice, the degree of transparency of communication in an organization may be
intermediate between what we have assumed here and the more usual postulate of public
communication. We conjecture that reputation-like arguments on the principal’s side
may help in circumventing non-manipulability constraints but the extent by which it is
so remains to uncover.
All those are extensions that we plan to analyze in further research.
40For some preliminary steps in that direction in the case of auctions, see Dequiedt and Martimort
(2006a).
41Dequiedt and Martimort (2006b) adapt the present framework to a public good environment.
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Appendix
• Proof of Proposition 1: Take any arbitrary mechanism (g(·),M) = ((g1(·),M1),...,(gn(·),Mn))
for any arbitrary communication space M = Πn
i=1Mi. Consider also a perfect Bayesian
continuation equilibrium of the overall contractual game induced by (g(·),M). Such
continuation PBE is a triplet {m∗(·), ˆ m∗(·),dµ(θ|m)} that satisﬁes:
• Agent Ai with type θi reports a private message m∗
i(θi) to the principal. The strategy
m∗(θ) = (m∗
1(θ1),...,m∗
n(θn)) forms a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium among the agents. We
make explicit the corresponding equilibrium conditions below.
• P updates his beliefs on the agents’ types following Bayes’ rule whenever possible, i.e,
when m ∈ supp m∗(·). Otherwise, beliefs are arbitrary. Let denote dµ(θ|m) the updated
beliefs following the observation of a vector of messages m.
• Given any such vector m (either on or out of the equilibrium path) and the corresponding
posterior beliefs, the principal publicly reveals the messages (ˆ m∗
−1(m),..., ˆ m∗
−n(m)) which



















Because we are in a private values context where the agents’ types do not enter directly








( ˆ m−1,..., ˆ m−n)∈Πn
i=1M−i
˜ S(q1(m1, ˆ m−1)),...,qn(mn, ˆ mn)) −
n X
i=1
ti(mi, ˆ m−i). (A.2)
Let us turn now to the agents’ Bayesian incentive compatibility conditions that must
be satisﬁed by m∗(·). For Ai, we have for instance
m
∗
























The proof of a Revelation Principle will now proceed in two steps. In the ﬁrst one, we
replace the general mechanism (g(·),M) by another general mechanism (˜ g(·),M) which
is not manipulable by the principal. In the second step, we replace (˜ g(·),M) by a direct
and truthful mechanism (¯ g(·),Θ).
Step 1: Consider the new mechanism (˜ g(·),M) deﬁned as:
˜ ti(mi,m−i) = ti(mi, ˆ m
∗
i(mi,m−i)) and ˜ qi(mi,m−i) = qi(mi, ˆ m
∗
−i(mi,m−i)) for i = 1,...,n.
(A.3)
Lemma 2 : (˜ g(·),M) is not manipulable by the principal, i.e., ˆ m∗
−i(m) = m ∀m ∈ M
given that ˜ g(·) is oﬀered.
Proof: Fix any m = (m1,...,mn) ∈ M. By (A.2), we have:










≥ ˜ S(q1(m1, ˜ m−1),...,qn(mn, ˜ m−n)) −
n X
i=1
ti(mi, ˜ m−i) ∀(˜ m−1,..., ˜ m−n) ∈ M
n
−i.
In particular, ∀m0 = (mi,m0
−i) ∈ Mn we get:






























˜ S(˜ q(m)) −
n X
i=1










Given that ˜ g(·) is played, the best manipulation made by the principal is ˆ m∗
−i(m) = m
for all m. ˜ g(·) is not manipulable by the principal.
It is straightforward to check that the new mechanism ˜ g(·) still induces an equilibrium
strategy vector m∗(θ) = (m∗
1(θ1),...,m∗
n(θn)) for the agents. Indeed, m∗(·) satisﬁes by

































Hence, m∗(·) still forms a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the new mechanism ˜ g(·).
Step 2: Consider now the direct revelation mechanism (¯ g(·),Θ2) deﬁned as:
¯ ti(θ) = ˜ ti(m
∗(θ)) and ¯ qi(θ) = ˜ qi(m
∗(θ)) for i = 1,...,n. (A.7)
Lemma 3 : ¯ g(·) is truthful in Bayesian incentive compatibility and not manipulable.
Proof: First consider the non-manipulability of the mechanism ¯ g(·). From (A.5), we get:
˜ S (¯ q(θ))−
n X
i=1



























˜ S (¯ q(θ))−
n X
i=1
















Hence, ¯ g(·) is non-manipulable.
Turning to (A.6), it is immediate to check that the agents’ Bayesian incentive con-






¯ ti(ˆ θi,θ−i) − θi¯ qi(ˆ θi,θ−i)|θi

. (A.10)
36• Proof of Proposition 2: Let consider the non-manipulability constraint (7) and deﬁne
a nonlinear price Ti(ˆ qi,θi) as Ti(ˆ qi,θi) = ti(θi, ˆ θ−i) for ˆ qi = qi(θi, ˆ θ−i). This deﬁnition is
non-ambiguous since, still from (7), all transfers ti(θi, ˆ θ−i) corresponding to the same
output qi(θi, ˆ θ−i) are the same. Note that Ti(·,θi) is deﬁned over the range of qi(θi,·)
that we denote rg(qi(θi,·)). For any ˆ qi ∈ rg(qi(θi,·)) and ˆ q−i ∈ rg(q−i(θ−i,·)), the non-












(A.11) is an optimality condition for the principal.






Ti(qi(ˆ θi,θ−i), ˆ θi) − θiqi(ˆ θi,θ−i)|θi

. (A.12)
The modiﬁed common agency game {Ti(qi, ˆ θi)}ˆ θi∈Θ has thus a Bayesian-Nash truthful
equilibrium.
Conversely, consider any equilibrium quantities q(θ) of the modiﬁed common agency
game and the nonlinear prices Ti(qi,θi) that sustain this equilibrium. These nonlinear
prices satisfy equations (A.11) and (A.12). Deﬁne a direct mechanism with transfers




ti(θ) ≥ ˜ S(q1(θ1, ˆ θ−1),...,qn(θn, ˆ θ−n)) −
n X
i=1
ti(θi, ˆ θ−i), ∀(θi, ˆ θ−i) ∈ Θ
n.
(A.13)




(ti(θi,θ−i) − θiqi(θi,θ−i)|θi) ≥ E
θ−i

ti(ˆ θi,θ−i) − θiqi(ˆ θi,θ−i)|θi

∀(θi, ˆ θi) ∈ Θ
2,
(A.14)
which ensures Bayesian incentive compatibility.
• Proof of Proposition 3: First, let us suppose that (11) is binding only at θi = ¯ θ.
Integrating (14) , we get

































Integrating by parts yields
E
θi











Of course minimizing the agents’ information rent requires to set Ui(¯ θ) = 0 when the
right-hand side in (14) is negative; something that will be checked later. Inserting (A.15)
into the principal’s objective function and optimizing pointwise yields (16).
Monotonicity conditions: Assumption 1 and strict concavity of S(·) immediately imply
that
∂qSB
∂θ−i (θi,θ−i) ≥ 0 and
∂qSB
∂θi (θi,θ−i) < 0.
Monotonicity of Ui(θi): From Assumption 2 ( ˜ fθ is small enough), the second term on the
right-hand side of (14) is small relative to the ﬁrst one and Ui(·) is strictly decreasing.
















which obviously holds under the assumptions of Proposition 3.
Global incentive compatibility: The global incentive compatibility condition writes as:
Ui(θi) ≥ Ui(ˆ θi)+ E
θ−i






S(qi(ˆ θi,θ−i)) − ˆ θiqi(ˆ θi,θ−i)|ˆ θi

.






















When qi(·) is the second-best schedule and for a ﬁxed strictly positive marginal density
f(·|·), both sides of the inequality are continuous functions of the degree of correlation,
where correlation is measured by the function ˜ fθi(θ−i|θi) and where continuity is with





BM(x)dx ≥ (ˆ θi − θi)q
BM(ˆ θi), (A.17)
which is clearly satisﬁed (with a strict inequality as soon as ˆ θi 6= θi) and qBM
i (θi) is
strictly decreasing in θi. Moreover, under these hypothesis, the local second-order con-





Therefore, a continuity argument shows that global incentive compatibility is satisﬁed for
˜ fθi(θ−i|θi) suﬃciently small.
• Proof of Proposition 4: The proof is straightforwardly adapted from that of Proposi-
tion 1 by replacing the Bayesian incentive compatibility concept by the dominant strategy
incentive compatibility concept. We omit the details.
• Proof of Proposition 5: The bilateral contracts exhibited in the proposition are such
that the ineﬃcient agents’ participation constraints are binding, namely ui(¯ θ,θ−i) = 0
for all θ−i ∈ Θ. These contracts satisfy also incentive compatibility. Moreover, they
implement the optimal bilateral quantity schedules. They thus maximize the principal’s
expected payoﬀ within the set of bilateral contracts.
We must check that a multilateral mechanism cannot achieve a greater payoﬀ. Non-
manipulability and dominant strategy incentive compatibility imply that there exists func-
tions hi(·) (i = 1,2) such that










subject to (A.18), qi(.,θ−i) decreasing and
ui(¯ θ,θ−i) ≥ 0 ∀θ−i ∈ Θ.
This last constraint is obviously binding at the optimum.
For any acceptable non-manipulable and dominant strategy mechanism which imple-
ments a quantity schedule qi(θi,θ−i), (A.18) implies that the principal can get the same
payoﬀ with a non-manipulable mechanism that implements the schedule qi(θi) = qi(θi, ¯ θ).
39The optimal such output is then qBM(θi). Moreover, such a mechanism can be imple-
mented with a bilateral contract with Ai, i.e., with transfers ti(θi) = ti(θi, ¯ θ) which depend
only on the type of this agent.
• Proof of Lemma 1: The proof is standard and is thus omitted. See for instance
Laﬀont and Martimort (2002, Chapters 3 and 9).
• Proof of Proposition 6: Using (24) for diﬀerentiable outputs, we obtain:















∀i = 1,2, ∀θi ∈ Θ.
(A.19)
The rent is decreasing when Assumption 2 holds and thus (11) is binding at ¯ θ. This yields























































Optimizing with respect to output this strictly concave objective and taking into account
that, at the solution, expectations are correct so that ˜ q−i(qi(θ),θi) = q−i(θ) yields (27).
By the same continuity argument as previously, the global incentive compatibility
conditions for the agents’ incentive problem are still satisﬁed when Assumption 2 holds.
Indeed, qi(θi,θ−i) is strictly non-increasing in θi and non-decreasing (resp. non-increasing)
in θ−i if outputs are substitutes (resp. complements) as requested by Lemma 1.
• Proof of Proposition 7: The ﬁrst steps follow those of the Proof of Proposition 6











































































from using again Assumptions 4 and 5. Finally, (A.20) holds. The optimal auction is
eﬃcient and the optimal output allocation is given by (29).
• Proof of Proposition 8: The proof follows the same lines as before. Given that the





















Using the Envelope Theorem yields:






















Under Assumption 2, the information rent of an agent Ai is decreasing with his type





































































































where we have taken into account that expectations about the nonlinear price Ti(q,θi)
are correct in equilibrium.















which solves (A.21) and (A.22).
The pair of marginal contributions given in (37) does the job.
If qSB(·) is decreasing in θi (which is true for a suﬃciently small degree of correlation),
the second-order condition of the agent’s problem holds and global incentive compatibility
is ensured.
42